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1. Introduction 
The European Commission’s Target Electricity Model (TEM) aims to integrate EU 
electricity markets by coupling interconnectors so that all electricity is (moderately) 
efficiently allocated across the EU by a single auction platform, Euphemia. By mid-2014 
the day-ahead coupling objective had been achieved from Finland to Portugal, including 
Great Britain. Coupling means that wholesale electricity prices should be equalized 
across boundaries unless the interconnector is constrained, in which case prices can 
diverge but the interconnector should be fully utilised. Before market coupling, capacity 
on interconnectors was sold before the day-ahead markets opened, and traders had to 
predict the price differences across interconnectors and bid for that capacity. Traders 
faced the risk that on the day the trade would no longer be profitable, in which case the 
option to flow power would be abandoned and the interconnector would be under-used, 
or, worse, the power would flow from the high price to the low price zone. 
Member States and the European Commission are understandably interested to 
know the size of the benefits of market coupling, as market design changes are costly, 
and for each country could amounts to tens of millions of euros. As a perhaps extreme 
example, when Britain replaced the Electricity Pool by the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA) in 2001, the UK’s National Audit Office cited Ofgem’s estimate 
“that market participants could incur total costs of up to £580 million in implementing 
NETA over the first 5 years, and then operating costs of £30 million a year.” (NAO, 
2003).  
In December 2012 the authors started work on a project commissioned by the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Energy to estimate the benefits of an 
integrated European energy market (gas and electricity). They delivered a near final draft 
in March 2013 (Newbery et al, 2013, hereafter our report), after which ACER started 
publishing estimates of the costs of not completing the integrated market in its 
subsequent reports (ACER, 2013, 2014). ACER had the advantage of direct access to 
some of the detailed Vulcanus data needed to make more accurate estimates (although 
they are still hampered by that lack of powers to request relevant data), while the pressure 
of time and the scarcity of data meant that our original report had of necessity to take 
short cuts. By mid-2015 the Transparency Regulation No 543/2013 (EC, 2013) should 
make more data public and available for more detailed academic and regulatory study.  
This paper makes use of the additional data supplied by ACER (2014) to update 
estimates of the benefits of integration, using the original methodology of Newbery et al. 
(2013). That allows a comparison between the approximate methods of that report with 
calculations based on more accurate and extensive data. It also recalculates the way in 
which the gains from coupling should be extrapolated to EU-wide net benefits, and 
discusses what can be learned from the fuller information that ACER has been able to 
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analyze. It adds to the ACER estimates by attempting to extrapolate ACER’s partial 
coverage to the EU-28, and although these are necessarily somewhat speculative, they 
identify more clearly the sources of some of the major integration gains, although they do 
not include possible additional gains from increased competition. 
1.1 Previous literature 
Newbery et al (2013) surveyed the existing and rather sparse literature on the quantitative 
benefits of market integration up to early 2013, and only the briefest summary is given 
here, as a fuller account is available in that report. Neuhoff et al (2011) explored the 
benefits of the most efficient form of market integration via nodal pricing (as in PJM
5
) 
but including a large volume (125GW) of predicted future wind connection. They found 
savings of 1.1-3.6% of variable operating costs. If variable (mainly fuel) costs are 
roughly half total wholesale market value then the gains from full integration would be 
0.6-1.8% of that value. Leuthold et al (2005) simulated the benefits of adding 8GW of 
offshore wind to Germany and moving to nodal pricing, estimating that gains of 0.6-1.3% 
came just from a move to nodal pricing and an additional 1% would come from nodally 
pricing the additional wind. Mansur and White (2009) compared before and after PJM 
expanded its nodally priced market area and found incremental gains of $3.6 million/GW 
capacity, which if applied to the EU with 820 GW capacity would deliver $3 billion per 
year (roughly €(2013) 2.3 billion) or 1.6% of wholesale value. Ott (2010) found that the 
total benefits of efficiently pricing PJM were $2.2 billion per year. However, these 
estimates are the benefits of moving to nodal pricing, whereas the TEM stops short at 
zonal pricing and so would not realize the full potential gains. 
When it comes to the benefits of market coupling the literature was even sparser. 
De Jong, Hakvoort and Sharma (2007) simulated a simplified model of France, Germany, 
The Netherlands and Belgium to estimate the welfare effects that flow-based market 
coupling (FBMC) would have on those countries, which they found to be about €200m 
per year. Meeus (2011) studied the history of the 600 MW Kontek HVDC cable from 
East Denmark to Germany, first from the period of no coupling, through two 
implementations of approximate coupling, ending with one-way market coupling, still 
imperfect as it resulted in flows against the price differential (FAPD) of about 5%.  The 
estimated welfare gain was about €10m per year on that one cable or about 
€17,000/MWyr. 
SEM Committee (2011) estimated the social costs of not using the two 
interconnectors between GB and the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of 
Ireland (which had a combined capacity of 950/910MW imports, 580MW exports) for 
2010. The estimates included price responses and a dead band (with no trade) of €5/MWh 
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to allow for various losses and transmission access charges. The social welfare gains 
from coupling were estimated at €30 million per year for an average import capacity of 
930 MW,
6
 or €32,000/MWyr, more than twice that of the Kontek cable.  
In summary, simulation studies of FBMC find modest efficiency benefits that 
may underestimate the potential for two reasons. The models lack sufficient richness to 
identify all of the transmission difficulties that FBMC may relieve, and they are 
calibrated to earlier generation portfolios with less renewable generation, and which 
therefore probably congest transmission systems less than now.  They indicate substantial 
value to increasing transmission capacity, and that FBMC will then be of even greater 
value in efficiently managing that capacity.  A before-and-after study of the Kontek cable 
finds modest welfare benefit of (imperfectly implemented) FBMC on that cable but 
coupling the SEM-GB interconnectors would seem to deliver larger gains. 
Since our report several new studies have been published, as well as the ACER 
annual reports discussed below. Böckers et al (2013) measure the extent to which market 
integration can share peak demand more efficiently, and find that about half of 
neighbouring countries peak demands are non-coincident and so the capacity needed to 
supply them jointly could be reduced. They report studies of price convergence that 
shows in some pair-wise comparisons that considerable convergence preceded coupling. 
They also report earlier studies that simulate the gains from improved competition and 
hence lower deadweight losses that our report did not explore. They roughly estimated 
gains from harmonizing PV support schemes and found large benefits (more than €700 
million per year just be reallocating support from Germany to Spain). Our report looked 
forward to 2030 and found very large gains from harmonizing all renewables support, but 
these potential gains are not discussed in this paper.  
Pellini’s (2014) doctoral dissertation used a power simulation model of Italy with 
an econometric estimates of price formation in neighbouring markets (FR, CH, AT, SL 
and GR) to examine the benefits of coupling the Italian market for 2012. She found that 
in the reference scenario for 2012 and allowing for continued market power, market 
coupling increased net welfare (the arithmetic sum of changes in producer, consumer and 
transmission surpluses) by €33 million/year (M€/yr), but if coupling credibly increased 
competition on the northern border, the net welfare gain rose to 396 M€/yr, although this 
is still 278 M€/yr below that theoretically achievable under perfect competition. In the 
high scenario in which the economy recovered relative to 2010 and oil prices were 
higher, the welfare gain from coupling increased to 132 M€/yr without more competition, 
and to 742 M€/yr with more competition, although still 326 M€/yr short of perfect 
competition. These simulation results show that the gains from integration can be highly 
sensitive to relative fuel prices (which clearly can affect the gains from trade), the level of 
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demand in the importing country (Italy) particularly in the presence of market power and 
hence rapidly rising prices as demand tightens, and of course the impact that coupling has 
on market power. 
1.2 Gains from integrating balancing markets 
The aim of the TEM is to integrate markets at all timescales, from contracting ahead, to 
day-ahead, intraday and balancing. DG ENER commissioned a report (Mott MacDonald, 
2013) in support of ACER’s Impact Assessment for the development of Electricity 
Balancing Framework Guidelines, which estimated the potential gains from integrating 
the European Balancing markets. The report found annual benefits from balancing energy 
trade between GB and France are potentially of the order of € 51 million. The estimated 
annual savings of integrating the Nordic countries are approximately € 221 million 
compared to individual “stand alone” balancing. Looking ahead to 2030 under 
“hypothetical” scenarios of the future European Power System the estimated benefits 
increase with wind penetration factor of wind generation and which justify the cost of 
investment for enhanced interconnectivity, integrating Balancing Markets and 
exchanging and sharing of reserves could achieve operational cost savings of about € 
3bn/year and reduced (up to 40% less) requirements for reserve capacity. 
2. The estimated gains from integration 
Estimating the benefits of integration is not straightforward, as it inevitably involves 
either comparing the status quo ex ante with a counterfactual, or comparing the situations 
before and after, in which many other factors may have changed, including the whole 
pattern of generation and cross-border flows and with that the pattern of price differences 
across interconnectors. In addition, as well as directly observable impacts, primarily 
increased flows and price changes as interconnectors are more efficiently used, there are 
harder to identify indirect benefits that may flow from increased cross-border 
competition, such as pressures to reduce cost, innovate, improve market functioning 
through increased liquidity, and improved sustainability if the volume of low-carbon 
electricity that can be delivered to final consumers increases and displaces more polluting 
sources. Security of supply should improve, although the full benefits of reducing EU-
wide reserve capacity needed requires those responsible for assuring security to make 
changes in the way they assess system security and adjust domestic capacity.
7
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  Thus in the preparations for the UK 2014 capacity auction designed to deliver the specified 
security standard of a Loss of Load Expectation of 3 hours per year, the minister responsible, on 
the advice of the Transmission System Operator, set a standard that ignored any net contribution 
that the interconnectors might supply – see DECC (2014), National Grid (2014) and Newbery and 
Grubb (2014). 
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In the longer run, the economics of building interconnectors should improve, 
encouraging further investment and allowing a more efficient location of generation 
across the EU to exploit the gains from improved trade. Finally, and of direct concern to 
Member States, as prices are expected to change, there will be winners and losers, 
although the US experience supports the view that a suitable allocation of Financial 
Trading Rights can in principle and to a large extent in practice, adequately compensate 
potential losers (Newbery and Strbac, 2011). 
The methodology for estimating the gains from coupling interconnectors at the 
day-ahead stage (which were largely complete by the end of 2014) is explained in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1 Benefits of market coupling: a) assuming no adverse flows and b) with flow 
originally against price differential 
 
Figure 1a shows one possible configuration of the interconnector before and after 
coupling. Volume A is the amount used before coupling with the net supply in the 
direction of trade, EG, and the net demand, DH, shown. Market coupling then leads to the 
full utilization of the interconnector to volume B, narrowing the price difference as 
shown. The benefit of coupling is then the darker green coloured trapezium, on the 
(competitive market) assumption that the net supply represents the marginal cost 
(including any scarcity rents) and the net demand represents the willingness to pay for 
power. In algebraic terms the benefit is the average of the price differences before and 
after coupling times the increase in the volume of trade or the area of the trapezium 
DEGH. If coupling eliminated the price difference, as it does in Figure 1b, the benefit of 
coupling is only one half the rectangle assuming no price change. 
Figure 1b shows the case in which the interconnector is flowing power in the 
wrong direction. In this case point A corresponds to, say, importing a volume 0A when 
the efficient coupled solution would be exporting an amount 0C (the capacity of the 
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interconnector is 0B in each direction, although there is no reason why export and import 
capacity should be the same). In this case the benefit is half the initial price difference ED 
times the volume AC, or the area DEH, which is half the area DEGF that assumes prices 
do not change. 
ACER makes the simplifying assumption that the prices do not change, which is 
probably valid for most Continental interconnectors embedded within the meshed AC 
network, but not for DC links such as IFA, where ignoring price changes would tend to 
over-estimate the gains by measuring the area DEFK if the estimate is made before 
coupling, but underestimate the gains if the post-coupled price difference is used. 
Newbery et al (2013) estimated that in the case of the England-France interconnector, 
IFA, a change of trade of 1 GW into GB would change prices by €1/MWh. In figure 1 it 
is necessary to correct the measured loss DEFK by subtracting the areas DKH and EFG, 
where the sum of KH and GF is given by the slope €1/MWh/GW and the change AB. 
This is half times the change in volume times the change in price, or equivalently ½ x 1 x 
AB
2
. 
In 2011 exports from FR→UK used 58% of total capacity and from UK→FR a 
further 12%, making the overall utilization of IFA 71%. In 2012 exports from FR→UK 
used 74% of total capacity and from UK→FR a further 10%, making the overall 
utilization of IFA 83%. The average NTC in both 2011 and 2012 was roughly 1.25 GW 
in each direction (i.e. only 63% of its rated capacity), so an underutilisation of 29% in 
2011 would be on average is 0.36 GW and the price change might be €0.36/MWh on 
average over the underutilization, half of which is €0.18/MWh. The extent of 
underutilization was 14 TWh so the overstatement is €2.5 million, reducing the total 2011 
loss from €22.4 million to €20 million or by 10% (so not insignificant). In 2012 the 
underutilization was 12.7 TWh so the overstatement was €2.3 million, reducing the total 
2012 loss from €20.8 million to €18.5 million or by 12% (Newbery et al, 2013, tables 8.2, 
8.4). The error in ignoring price impacts increases as the square of the shortfall and so 
becomes smaller as interconnectors are more fully used. At the other extreme, if coupling 
eliminates the price difference, then the actual gain would be only half the measured gain 
assuming no price change. 
 
3. Comparing the various measures of welfare losses 
The results of comparing the original rough estimates in Newbery et al (2013) with the 
presumably more accurate ACER (2014) estimates are illuminating. The estimates in 
Newbery et al (2013) concentrated on a few interconnectors for which there was good 
data and which were not then coupled. The social welfare losses adjusted for price 
changes on England-France interconnector IFA were 22% of potential trade in 2011 
(30% of actual trade) and 12% of a higher value of potential trade in 2012 (14% of actual 
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trade), averaging 16% of potential trade (20% of actual trade).
8
 The Germany-France 
interconnection became coupled in Q4 2010 so the loss on the German-France 
interconnection was estimated for Q1-Q3 2010. The estimated loss was 26% of potential 
trade, ignoring resistive losses as these interconnectors were short (in theory infinitely 
short) AC links. The losses for France-Spain 2011 and 2013 (not given in our report but 
given in the Appendix to this paper) were 11 and 12%, again ignoring resistive losses.  
In conclusion the report estimated the social losses of not coupling for these 
examples at 10-20% of the gains from trade, depending on the year, the interconnector, 
and market prices. After coupling, these losses should fall to zero. To put this into 
context, EU exports (and imports) in 2011 were about 315 TWh out of 3,080 TWh 
supplied (or about 10%). The original report then argued that if losses were 10-20% of 
interconnector trade, and trade were 10% of total EU demand, then the losses would be 
about 1-2% of total demand. 
However, the welfare losses on the interconnectors were estimated as a 
percentage of the gains from trade, which is the arbitrage gain from the price difference, 
not the standard measure of the value of trade, which is the price of the product times the 
volume traded. Thus to scale up the evidence from a few interconnectors one needs this 
measure of the gains from total EU-29 trade, which is difficult to estimate as it depends 
on the price difference across the borders. One way to derive a very rough estimate is to 
note that the average absolute price difference across IFA for 2011-12 was €11/MWh.9 
Additional estimates come from the incremental value of expanding interconnectors, 
which ACER (2014, fig 48) provides for a sample of such links. The values are given in € 
million per 100 MW extra capacity assuming no change in prices at each end, from which 
one can estimate the average initial price difference across each, assuming 100% 
utilization of the extra 100 MW. The average is €6/MWh with a range from €0-25/MWh 
and a standard deviation of €6/MWh.  
As prices have been converging over time (ACER, 2014) it might be more 
reasonable to take a value closer to €10/MWh as a rough estimate of the pre-integration 
price difference (and arguably an underestimate), in which case this average value of the 
gains from trade would have been €3.15 billion/yr, compared to the value of total 
wholesale demand of €150 billion at an average wholesale price of €50/MWh.10  If the 
estimated 10-20% welfare loss as a percentage of the gains from trade were to hold 
across the whole EU, the gains from efficient market coupling compared to the 2004 case 
of no coupling would be €315-630 million per year, or 0.2-0.4% of wholesale market 
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 Newbery et al (2013) tables 8.2 and 8.4 but correcting for the price change. 
9
 Newbery et al (2013, tables 8.2, 8.4) assuming an average of 1,250MW for 8,760 hours. 
10
  That was the estimate for 2011 and equal to the measured price in 2012, which fell slightly to 
€46/MWh in 2013, see ACER (2014b, fig 35). 
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value, one fifth of the 1-2% of rough estimates (as the arbitrage price difference is only 
one fifth of the average price). 
ACER (2014) adopted the simpler form of our methodology, ignoring price 
changes and measuring the initial price difference times the change in volume, valid for 
most AC interconnections. This estimate of the ‘loss in social welfare’ due to the absence 
of market coupling is presented in Table 1. The total loss for these remaining uncoupled 
interconnectors averaged €365 m/yr, which is towards the lower of the estimate given 
above, but as many interconnectors had been coupled by this time, this figure is an under-
estimate of the pre-coupling period. 
Table 1 Estimated ‘loss in social welfare’ 2012–2013  
Border 
2012 
€ million 
2013 
€ million 
average 
share 
NTC 
MW 
Loss 
€’000/MWY loss/trade 
CH-FR € 66.36 € 68.81 21% 2,300 € 29.92 37% 
NI-GB  € 21.82 € 21.07 7% 500 € 42.14 54% 
CH-DE € 39.25 € 41.81 12% 4,000 € 10.45 13% 
CH-IT € 33.45 € 17.64 8% 4,000 € 4.41 8% 
CZ-DE € 32.98 € 35.13 10% 1,600 € 21.96 27% 
AT-CZ € 23.28 € 16.21 6% 800 € 20.26 31% 
FR-IT € 18.85 € 18.13 6% 2,700 € 6.71 9% 
AT-SI € 18.37 € 18.73 6% 900 € 20.81 26% 
AT-HU € 17.69 € 14.56 5% 800 € 18.20 25% 
FR-GB € 14.03 € 15.85 5% 2,000 € 7.93 9% 
AT-CH € 13.24 € 14.54 4% 900 € 16.16 19% 
NL-GB € 12.53 € 10.06 3% 1,000 € 10.06 14% 
ES-FR € 8.34 € 7.25 2% 1,000 € 7.25 10% 
IE-GB (EWIC) € 0.32 € 33.58 5% 500 € 67.16 42% 
Total € 321 € 333 100% 23,000 € 14.49 18% 
Source: ACER (2014b, fig 47) and ENTSO-E for estimated NTCs 
 
The first two columns in Table 1 give the ACER data. Column 3 gives the 
contribution of each interconnector to the total measured loss as a percentage. Column 4 
gives the Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) based on the 2012 data used by Newbery et al 
(2013), updated for some interconnectors from web searches. These figures should be 
treated as rough estimates as the variation on some interconnectors is from zero to several 
times the value shown in the table, and the weighted average standard deviation (SD) of 
the hourly 2012 NTCs on these borders was 42%.  
Some of the individual values in the originally published ACER Report were 
implausibly high, particularly those between the Single Electricity Market (SEM, the 
combined markets of NI and IE) and GB). After discussions with ACER, these figures 
have been revised in the latest version placed on the website in December 2014. They are 
still high in relation to capacity, even though they have been minimized by putting the 
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links in at their full nominal value when NI-GB has been at only 50% capacity for some 
time. A quick calculation for 2012 for NI-GB in Appendix Table A2 suggests a loss of 
€7.5 million in 2012, which is very different from the original value of €43.6 m and even 
the revised value of €21.82 m shown in Table 1. SEM Committee (2011) estimated the 
2010 welfare loss of both SEM-GB cables together at €30 million. If the two SEM-GB 
interconnectors are ignored, the social welfare loss falls to €290 million, 16% of trade 
value. 
The data allow one estimate of the loss by comparing it to interconnector 
capacity, which in Table 1 is €16,870/MWyear, or excluding the rather high value for 
SEM-GB, is €12,670/MWyr. Scaling this up by the lower of import and export capacity 
of 83 GW gives €1,052 million/yr. The final column takes the estimated loss and divides 
it by the value of potential arbitrage trade for 8,000 hours per year at 100% utilization 
and assuming an arbitrage gain of €10/MWh, and this welfare loss as a proportion of the 
potential arbitrage gains from trade falls from 20% to 16%, right in the middle of the 
range estimated above. One caveat is that if all interconnectors are efficiently coupled, 
then the gains over each interconnector may fall, so scaling up to the whole of the EU 
may overestimate the total gains. 
 
4. Other measures of the gains from improved market integration 
The Target Electricity Model aims to integrate markets not just at the day-ahead stage, 
but intra-day and real-time, or via sharing balancing services, as well as sharing reserve 
capacity and allowing more efficient cross-border trading up to three years before 
delivery. Newbery et al (2013, §5.3) estimated the additional gains that could come from 
efficiently moving away a Baseline case of national self-security, in which the only gains 
are short-term arbitrage of the kind discussed above. In the less optimistic case in which 
only half the socially beneficial transmission investment is completed and under 
Continuing Policy (not the most ambitious renewables targets also considered) the EU-28 
gains above Baseline could be €10-€16 billion by 2020 or 7-11% current wholesale 
market value, and possibly to €8-€36 billion by 2030. Sharing balancing, reserves and 
demand side response under a fully smart EU-wide grid could almost double the lower 
values and increase the top of the range by 20%. Such gains would take substantial 
investment and considerable institutional change, as well as trust, to deliver, which will 
take time - the TEM has already taken nearly two decades since the initial steps with the 
first Electricity Directive 96/92/EC. In the shorter run it is worth estimating the more 
realizable gains from better intraday and balancing, both addressed in ACER (2014). 
4.1 Intra-day trading benefits 
Since 2010, day-ahead utilization of interconnectors has risen from 32.1% to 39.0% in 
2013 or by 20%, and intra-day commercial (i.e. not TSO led) trading from 1.8% to 2.9% 
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of NTC, or by 61% (ACER, 2014, fig 50). On borders with continuous trading, almost 
half of this is requested less than three hours before delivery and is thus delivering a 
valuable service in responding to improved forecasts of intermittent power and demand 
near to dispatch. 
It is difficult to estimate the benefits from better integration across the EU-28. 
Data provided in ACER (2014) give some indication, and are reproduced as Appendix 
Table A3. They suggest that the benefits from more efficient intra-day trading over the 
borders sampled might be €2.56/MWh (SD = €0.6) averaged over every hour of the year 
per interconnector. If interconnectors are only 40% fully utilized (ACER, 2014, fig 50) 
and if the total interconnector capacity is 83 GW,
11
 and if the volume of intraday trading 
might double from its 2012 low level of 3%, an extra 2,400 MW might be available on 
average perhaps 6,000 hours per year
12
 with a total value of €37 million/yr. This is 
consistent with scaling up the data in table A3 to the total interconnector capacity level, 
and assuming 200 MW are traded on the days when significant price differences are 
observed,
13
 which would give a value of €37 million/yr.  
4.2 Balancing benefits 
Most countries are currently reluctant to share balancing services, but the aim is to create 
the institutions and trust to enhance the efficiency of balancing interconnected systems. 
Switzerland, for example currently procures over half its reserves from abroad (ACER, 
2014, fig 54). However, as with the gains from trade, one needs to be careful in 
estimating the gains from shared balancing services. 
ACER (2014) provides estimates of the potential gains transcribed in Table 2. The 
simplest benefit to be gained is the netting of imbalances, in which one side of the border 
is short and the other side long, so that together they can reduce imbalances on each side. 
The other obvious benefit is to be derived from procuring balancing energy from abroad 
when it is cheaper. Table 2 gives estimates of each for a selection of borders in 2013. The 
total value for FR-GB is €39 m/yr, which can be compared with the estimates given in 
Mott MacDonald (2013) of full unconstrained Common Merit Order shared balancing 
between France and GB of €51 m/yr, which is of comparable size, given the difficulties 
of properly modelling the potential benefits. If one takes the balancing benefit as 
€33,000/MWyr (from the bottom right average) and if that is scaled up to the 2 GW, FR-
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 Data in convenient matrix form is available at 
https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/ntc/archive/NTC-Values-Winter-2010-
2011.pdf but post 2011 data does not seem to be available in convenient matrix form. The totals 
are the lower of import or export values limited by maxima. 
12
 NTCs vary by season and for other reasons so this is a guesstimate of availability of 68%. 
13
 The hours recorded in Table A3 assume at least 100 MW were free, so the assumption here is 
that as that was a de minimis cut-off, the actual is twice as high. 
12 
 
GB interconnector the result would be €66 m, rather higher than this estimate, but again 
comparable.  
 
Table 2 Estimate of potential benefits from the integration of balancing energy markets 
per border, 2013  
  
Potential 
imbalance 
netting GWh 
Potential 
exchange  
balancing 
energy 
GWh 
max 
2012 
NTC MW 
Netting 
benefits € 
million 
Exchange 
benefits € 
million 
Netting 
value per 
€/MWh 
Exchange 
value per 
€/MWh 
Total 
benefit 
€'000/MWY 
GB-NL 231.95 1,816.45 1,000 € 15.9 € 66.5 € 68.38 € 36.60 € 82.4 
ES-PT 727.46 3,595.93 2,400 € 25.3 € 50.2 € 34.78 € 13.95 € 31.4 
AT-CZ 144.24 617.98 500 € 12.6 € 47.3 € 87.15 € 76.49 € 119.7 
FR-GB 927.49 1,463.55 2,000 € 17.5 € 21.6 € 18.88 € 14.78 € 19.6 
AT-HU 140.8 670.10 800 € 9.6 € 29.4 € 67.83 € 43.80 € 48.6 
HU-RO 268 1,023.94 400 € 18.1 € 19.3 € 67.35 € 18.80 € 93.3 
FR-ES 954.05 1,821.72 1,300 € 20.2 € 14.9 € 21.16 € 8.17 € 27.0 
CZ-PL 114.85 457.29 150 € 9.7 € 18.6 € 84.81 € 40.59 € 188.7 
FR-CH 110.05 1,653.60 3,200 € 4.1 € 24.0 € 37.35 € 14.53 € 8.8 
BE-NL 
 
542.17 1,400   € 26.8   € 49.41 € 19.1 
PL-SK 66.82 121.93 550 € 6.7 € 19.8 € 99.97 € 162.31 € 48.1 
AT-SI 
 
405.61 900   € 24.0   € 59.19 € 26.7 
CZ-SK 
 
448.33 1,600   € 23.5   € 52.48 € 14.7 
CH-AT 94.82 362.33 800 € 4.2 € 14.6 € 44.19 € 40.38 € 23.5 
EE-FI 68.18 434.66 370 € 2.3 € 14.3 € 34.32 € 32.92 € 45.0 
HU-SK   300.30 180   € 14.1   € 46.82 € 78.1 
 Total 
or 
average 3,849 15,736 17,550 € 146 € 429 € 37.96 € 27.25 € 32.8 
Source: ACER (2014, figs 56 and 58) and ENTSO-E 
 
If this balancing benefit of €33,000/MWyr is scaled up to the 83 GW of 
interconnection, the result would be €2.7 billion per year, which seems very high. 
Newbery et al (2013, Figure 5.8) reported the gains from a model-based estimate of 
shared balancing at about €1.2 billion per year in 2015,14 and perhaps €3.4 billion per 
year by 2030, when higher intermittency would considerably increase the value of shared 
balancing. These estimates, however, were additional to all the other benefits of market 
integration, and clearly if intra-day trading is both efficient and continued until just 
before dispatch, the remaining benefits from subsequent balancing will have already been 
                                                 
14
 This is estimated as the difference between “Int EU reserves” and “Int self-secure” in figure 
5.8, which are described in Newbery et al (2013, p75) as the result of “some sharing of various 
balancing services between countries”. As such they may be an underestimate of the potential of 
full sharing of all balancing services. 
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largely captured. In short, there are problems in allocating the gains from integration over 
different time-scales, particularly as forecasting improves, and so one should not attach 
particular weight to one part of the total gains. There is the additional point that by its 
nature it is difficult to properly model future imbalances in an optimizing engineering 
model, as these rely on imperfections that the model may be designed to ignore, as well 
as estimating the scarcity costs given the many short-run constraints limited their 
delivery.  
ACER (2014, p140) admits that it is very difficult to properly value the potential 
benefits of sharing balancing services as that could “be obtained only through having 
access to (and the ability to process) all the data corresponding to the bids and offers 
submitted by all BSPs from all the imbalance areas”. Instead the estimate is based on “the 
imbalance price differences across imbalance price areas in Europe.” Using the data from 
fig 56 shown in Table 2 one can calculate the value of netting and exchanging energy in 
€/MWh (the penultimate last two columns) which show netting values of €32/MWh and 
€27/MWh respectively, substantially higher than the day-ahead arbitrage values, but not 
implausible for balancing markets. 
Given the very high total value based on a simple extrapolation from the data in 
Table 2, it is worth exploring how better to extrapolate to the EU-28 from data covering 
only one-fifth of cross-border interconnection. From the data in table 2, the coefficients 
of variation (CVs) of netting and energy trading per MWh are 72% and 134% and the CV 
of the total benefits per MW is 146%, while the average of the two least valuable borders 
is one third the average value. If the remaining interconnectors are one-third as valuable 
per MW NTC, given that the potential benefits identified in the subset of interconnectors 
amounts to €575 million, (larger for this subset than all the other potential gains), the 
total would be €1.3 billion per year, or 41% of the total estimated gains from trade (and 
double the upper end of the estimated arbitrage gains from coupling). If so, then the 
benefits from integrating cross-border balancing are considerably larger than those from 
coupling at the day-ahead stage, and if to realize these gains more spare capacity has to 
be held back to facilitate balancing, that would seem worthwhile.  
On the other hand, sharing balancing across borders is just one way of delivering 
flexibility at short notice, and as dispatch becomes smarter, and as more Demand Side 
Resources and storage are made available, so the marginal value of any one source of 
flexibility is likely to fall. Offsetting that will be the growth in need for flexibility with 
the growth in intermittent wind and solar PV generation. 
14 
 
4.3 Welfare impact of unscheduled flows 
Acer (2014, figure 62) distinguishes between loop flows and unscheduled transit flows, 
which together are classified as unscheduled flows that arise because of imperfect 
coordination between TSOs, and the desire to treat each dispatch zone as a copper plate, 
instead of the US Standard Market Design of nodal pricing. The costs of this inefficiency 
has risen from €324 million in 2011 to €469 million in 2013 for the 20 borders studied 
totaling 35 GW out of a total of 83 GW. The gains in 2013 are thus €13 million/GW 
NTC, and if the remaining borders are only half as valuable, the potential gains would be 
€790 million/year.  
4.4 Costs of curtailment at borders 
Acer (2014, fig 65) gives the costs of curtailment at a selected set of borders, reproduced 
with NTC data in Table A4. For the 26 GW of borders for which data are available for 
both 2012 and 2013 the total cost averaged €670/MWyr. As several borders have been 
curtailed in both directions one can scale up in two ways. The higher estimate would be 
to take the higher value direction only for those for which we have values in both 
directions, for which there are 6.350 GW with data for both years, for which the average 
cost was €1,771/MWyr, but only include export interconnector capacity. Scaling this up 
to 83 GW total would give an annual cost of €147 million/yr. The lower value would be 
to scale up the overall average of €891/MWyr by the sum of export and import capacities 
of 132GW, which would give €117 million/yr. Finally, as a compromise, one can take the 
total value for both years and the total capacities and scale up to 179 GW (total import 
plus export) to give €140 million/yr. The resulting range from €117-€147 million/yr is 
reassuringly tight. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The high value of increasing the efficiency of interconnector use is clear at a number of 
critical borders. The earlier estimate of the gains from increasing cross-border trade from 
10% of demand (315 TWh) to 15% of demand (i.e. by 158 TWh) assumed an average 
price difference before and after trade of €10/MWh and gives the benefit as €1.58 
billion/yr or 1% of the value of wholesale demand. This might be an under-estimate if 
some fraction of trade is in a perverse direction. Just improving the existing day-ahead 
arbitrage trade on interconnectors through coupling is worth 10-20% of the potential 
gains from trade, which at €10/MWh is 10-20% of €3.15 billion/yr or €315-630 
million/yr, or less than half the figure of 1% of the value of wholesale demand. This 
lower figure seems consistent with the day-ahead arbitrage gains estimated by ACER 
(2014), although the figures reported in summary table 3 are based on the gains per MW 
of capacity and are then considerably larger at €1 billion/yr. 
15 
 
However, in addition to these arbitrage gains from market integration, intraday 
trading might be worth €40 million/yr, balancing benefits which might be €1.3 billion/yr 
or could be as large as €2.7 billion/yr, with proportionate scaling. These short-term 
realizable gains amount to €2.4 billion/yr and are itemized and subtotaled in Table 3. 
If unscheduled flows could be prevented (which might require a significant design 
change to nodal pricing) then somewhere between €500 – €900 million might be gained. 
Finally, the cost of curtailment might be €50-150 million. Including these longer-term 
potential benefits gives €3.4 billion/yr, which is 2.3% of the value of wholesale demand, 
but more than 100% of the current gains from trade over the interconnectors, which is a 
more relevant metric. 
 
Table 3 Potential gains from market integration 
  ACER sample 2013 EU-28 
estimate 
Newbery et al (2013) EU-28 
estimate 
  €M NTC 
2012 
value 
€'000/MWY 
or MWh 
€M €M NTC value 
€'000/MWY 
or MWh 
€M 
increase trade by 
50% 
          € 50 € 1,575 
Day-ahead 
market coupling 
€ 279 22,000 € 12.7 € 1,052 € 63 4,300 € 14.6 € 1,208 
Intraday coupling   10,050 € 2.6 € 37       
Balancing € 575 17,550 € 32.8 € 1,343       
subtotal       € 2,432       
Unscheduled 
flows 
€ 469 34,900 € 13.4 € 790       
curtailment € 41 52,385 € 0.8 € 140       
Total       € 3,362         
Note: the values for increased trade and intraday coupling (highlighted and italicized) are 
based on values per MWh, curtailment is based on import and export flows 
together. 
 
Specifically, if the value of interconnectors is increased by 100%, then already 
commercially attractive investments in interconnectors become even more so, and 
perhaps a large number of currently marginal investments would look attractive. 
Certainly the case studies considered suggested that expanding transmission links that are 
severely congested is also already likely to be very cost effective. The conclusion is that 
market coupling delivers total benefits that should substantially exceed the costs of the 
required market design changes, and that the delays in market integration since the 
market integration project started in 1997 have been large. Further gains could be reaped 
from a move to nodal pricing but these would have to be counterbalanced against the 
16 
 
claimed loss of liquidity and scope for market manipulation that such a move might risk. 
What emerges very strongly is the growing need for more interconnection. 
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Appendix 
Using the same methods set out in Newbery et al (2013) it is straightforward to compute 
the social welfare losses on the Spanish-French interconnection for 2011 and 2012, 
ignoring resistive losses as this is an AC interconnection, and similarly for the Moyle 
interconnector between GB and NI. 
Table A1 Social welfare loss on the Spain-France interconnection 
FR-ES trade data 2011 
  Potential value exports FR=>ES € 53,697,430 68% 
Potential value exports ES=>FR € 25,517,523 32% 
Potential total value trade € 79,214,953 100% 
Loss underexport FR=>ES € 3,486,071 4% 
Loss underexport ES=>FR € 3,331,524 4% 
FAPD FR=>ES € 1,265,000 2% 
FAPD ES=>FR € 260,053 0% 
Total loss € 8,342,650 11% 
   FR-ES trade data 2012 
  Potential value exports FR=>ES € 56,482,617 55% 
Potential value exports ES=>FR € 45,810,192 45% 
Potential total value trade € 102,292,810 100% 
Loss underexport FR=>ES € 5,648,860 6% 
Loss underexport ES=>FR € 3,621,960 4% 
FAPD FR=>ES € 986,480 1% 
FAPD ES=>FR € 1,538,622 2% 
Total loss € 11,795,923 12% 
 
Table A2 Social welfare loss on the Northern Ireland – GB Moyle interconnector 2012 
Potential value of trade € 44,285,421 100% 
Value of actual imports € 36,814,378 83% 
Value of actual exports € 9,418 0% 
total value of trade € 36,823,797 83% 
Losses under-importing € 3,001,142 7% 
Losses under-exporting € 219,209 0% 
Loses FAPD € 4,244,833 10% 
total losses € 7,465,185 17% 
 
The potential benefits from more efficient intra-day trading are shown in Table A3, using 
data from ACER (2014). The estimated value assumes that if the price difference is greater 
than €10/MWh it is worth on average €15/MWh, if between €5-10/MWh then it is worth 
€7/MWh, and if €1-5 then it is worth €3/MWh. Using these values the average over the 8760 
hours per year are as shown in the final column in Table A3. 
 
Table A3 Potential for intraday cross-border trade and efficiency in the use of cross-border 
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intraday capacity on a selection of EU borders – 2013 (number of hours) 
border and 
auction Direction 
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ES-PT (implicit) ES->PT 2,400 81 74 237 392 392 100% € 2,444   
  PT->ES 2,300 67 86 225 378 378 100% € 2,282 € 0.54 
FR-DE (implicit cts) FR->DE 1,500 976 168 32 813 13 69% € 15,912   
  DE->FR 1,200 878 153 58 693 30 64% € 14,415 € 3.46 
ES-FR (explicit) ES->FR 900 784 535 364 922 288 55% € 16,597   
  FR->ES 1,100 616 397 282 651 301 50% € 12,865 € 3.36 
FR-BE (pro rata) BE->FR 2,000 463 780 700 509 5 41% € 14,505   
  FR->BE 1,200 467 399 542 693 108 49% € 11,424 € 2.96 
FR-IT (explicit) FR->IT 2,500 447 372 614 567 82 40% € 11,151   
  IT->FR 1,000 254 426 306 370 - 38% € 7,710 € 2.15 
FR-GB (explicit) GB->FR 2,000 431 321 423 435 24 37% € 9,981   
  FR->GB 2,000 419 452 1,680 829 44 32% € 14,489 € 2.79 
  Total 10,050 
      
    
  
Average per 
interconnector   981 694 911 1209 303 56% € 22,296 € 2.55 
 
          Sources: ACER (2014 fig 53), ENTSO-E 
 
Table A4 takes the raw data from ACER (2014) and rearranges the borders into 
the directions with the larger of the two flows on that border in the top part, then the 
smaller valued direction, then the borders with only one direction recorded, first for 
which both years’ data are available, then for those with data in only one year, and finally 
totals and averages for each year and for both years. The values are then related to the 
estimated NTC values for 2011 from the ETSO NTC matrix. 
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Table A4 Total curtailment costs per border      €  
border 2012 2013 NTC average/MW 
GR->IT € 659,035 € 2,418,188 500 € 3,077.2 
BG->GR € 2,400 € 24,068 550 € 24.1 
AT->IT € 57,179 € 328,270 220 € 876.0 
DE->CH € 35,115 € 12,643 1,500 € 15.9 
FR->UK € 9,239,274 € 8,942,479 2,000 € 4,545.4 
ES->FR € 328,482 € 211,612 580 € 465.6 
NL->UK € 88,026 € 139,902 1,000 € 114.0 
major pair € 10,409,511 € 12,077,162 6,350 € 1,770.6 
IT->AT € 589 € 301 285 € 1.6 
CH->DE € 8,205 € 2,681 3,500 € 1.6 
IT->GR € 33,825 € 111,359 500 € 145.2 
UK->FR € 3,326,577 € 807,553 2,000 € 1,033.5 
FR->ES € 114,263 € 69,357 1,300 € 70.6 
UK->NL € 271 € 197,946 1,000 € 99.1 
minor pair € 3,483,730 € 1,189,197 8,585 € 272.2 
all pairs € 13,893,241 € 13,266,359 14,935 € 909.3 
    
  
  
FR->IT € 19,816 € 3,022,625 2,575 € 590.8 
FR->CH € 146,186 € 82,229 3,200 € 35.7 
CH->AT € 2,081 € 783 1,200 € 1.2 
CH->IT € 2,660,783 € 1,832,740 4,165 € 539.4 
subtotal   € 2,828,866 € 4,938,377 11,140 € 348.6 
  
 
  
 
  
DKw->DE € 13,690   585 € 23.4 
PL->SK € 31,288   500 € 62.6 
DE->NL € 4,700   3850 € 1.2 
subtotal € 49,678   4935 € 10.1 
IT->CH   € 2,564 1810 € 1.4 
SL->IT 
 
€ 502,712 160 € 3,142.0 
IE->UK  € 6,033 500 € 12.1 
UK->IE   € 5,661,833 750 € 7,549.1 
subtotal   € 6,173,142 3,220 € 1,917.1 
Total 2012 € 16,771,785   23,090 € 726.4 
Total 2013   € 24,377,878 23,090 € 1,055.8 
Total all € 16,771,785 € 24,377,878 23,090 € 891.07 
Sources: ACER (2014 fig 65), ENTSO-E 
Note: there are no data for PL=>SK so the NTC is from SK=>PL 
 
